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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO

AWARD OF
BOARD OF ARBITRATION
P&M Grievance #3468

and
Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its suspension or
discharge of the grievants, Robert W. Bingham,
Benjamin L. Clayton and Ronald C. Simpkins.

DATED: October 19, 1987
STATE OF New York)Ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1987

Donald E. Wightman
Dissenting

I, Donald E. Wightman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1987

William A. 0'Shea
Concurring

I, William A. O'Shea do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
Of America, AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
P&M Grievance #3468

and
Boston Edison Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement by its suspension or discharge of the grievants, Robert W. Bingham,
Benjamin L. Clayton and Ronald C. Simpkins?
If so, what shall be the remedy, if any?
Hearings were held on May 29 and June 19, 1987 at which
time the above-named grievants and representatives of the abovenamed Union and Company appeared.
full opportunity

All concerned were afforded

to offer evidence and argument and to examine

and cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs. Donald E. Wightman and

William A. O'Shea served respectfully as the Union and Company
Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
was waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath

A stenographic record was taken; the parties filed

post-hearing briefs.
The Board of Arbitration met subsequently in Executive
Session.
Impliedly, if not by express stipulation, I am persuaded
that by the nature of the case, the opening statements, and the
Company's charge against the grievants that they engaged in the
crime of conspiracy to commit a theft within the meaning of the
Massachusetts Criminal Law, the standard of proof in this case
is the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
The testimony of the security personnel from Jordan Marsh
does not meet that standard.

Neither the Boston Edison Company

nor Jordan Marsh disclosed the identity of "Jay," the purported
Jordan Marsh employee who broached the idea of stealing VCRs to
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the grievants,

either on his own initiative or after he heard

the grievants discussing the plan, nor was "Jay" produced as a
witness.

Had the Union pressed its request for "Jay's" identity,

I would have ordered his disclosure, as my statements in the
record show.

Absent the direct testimony of "Jay" and absent

the Union's ability to cross-examine him, I think it reasonably
possible that the testimony of Paul J. Jones, a Jordan Marsh
security officer, as to the alleged admissions of the grievants
regarding their participation in moving the VCRs to a location
near their trucks and subsequently hiding them, and to their plan
to remove them from the building for their and "Jay's" benefit,
in the face of conflicting

testimony by some of the grievants of

what they told him and why they made admissions, may have been
embellished

to shore up a general investigation of how merchan-

dise has been stolen from its property and to gain for the Jordan
Marsh security force a "success" in that investigation.
What happend here, I perceive, is that Jordan Marsh (through
"Jay") and its security office may have undertaken a scam to entice and tempt the grievants to engage in a theft.

I consider

that a lamentable way to generate and then uncover the commission
of a crime.

Nonetheless, it is permissable activity, and if the

grievants were culpable as participants or accessories, they
would be guilty of the crime and subject to discharge.

But based

on the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, if this was
all there is to this case, I would conclude as plausible, that
the grievants did not participate in the manner and to the extent
charged.

And that they made certain admissions not because they

were guilty, but as they said, they were threatened with arrest
but promised that nothing would happen if the merchandise was
returned.

In short, though there is considerable evidence
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implicating them in the conspiracy and the crime, there remains
a reasonable possibility in my mind that what happened may have
been a "setup" to make the security force of Jordan Marsh look
good, even in the face of resistance from the grievants.
But what happened thereafter eliminates any reasonable
doubt I may have had.

I find that the testimony of Edward

MacCormadcand William Kilroy, Boston Edison security officers,
to be accurate.

Between 12 and 22 days after the events at

Jordan Marsh, the Company interviewed Benjamin Clayton and Robert
Sluthe.

I fail to see how or why, with the passage of that time,

there would be a reiteration of the "admissions" or statements
given earlier to the Jordan Marsh security officer.

I reject

the explanation that Clayton wanted to be consistent with what
was told Jordan Marsh.

I am convinced that if the grievants were

in fact innocent, they would have asserted their innocence in
that later investigation, or on their own initiative immediately
or soon after the events at Jordan Marsh.

Indeed,

Clayton

admitted during these proceedings that he told MacCormack and
Jones that each grievant had moved the VCRs. So, while I can see
some reasonable grounds for why the Jordan Marsh witness might
have had a bias or preconceived end, I find no such bias or any
other reason why MacCormack and Kilroy from Boston Edison would
falsify what Clayton and Sluthe 1 told them, the grievants denials
or explanations in the arbitration hearing notwithstanding.

1. The Union contends that Sluthe was not in any position to know
what the grievants had actually done because he had remained in
the vault area. However, there are a variety of ways by which
Sluthe could have acquired such knowledge notwithstanding his lack
of physical observation. Again and significantly, I find no
reason why Sluthe would give false testimony about his fellow
workers.

-4-

Put another way, assuming validity to the grievants fear
of the police and their willingness to admit to acts they had
not done because of a promise of no reprisals or further

action

while at Jordan Marsh, I cannot accept any explanation or justification for their failure to proclaim their innocence more than
ten days later to their own employer.

I conclude therefore that

what MacCormack and Kilroy said in their testimony at the hearing
is what the grievant Clayton., and Sluthe told them in the investigation by Boston Edison, and what the grievants did.
testimony during the Boston Edison investigation

Clayton's

implicates all

the grievants within any relevant standard of proof.
The grievants' misconduct justifies their
dismissals.
Accordingly, the suspensions
or discharges of the grievants are sustained.

DATED: October 19, 1987
STATE OF New York)
.
COUNTY OF New York)
'

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405, U.A.W.

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 300 545 86

and
Chandler Evans, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the July, 1986 suspension of Gilman Vaillancourt? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in West Hartford,
Connecticut on February 26, 1987 at which time Mr. Vaillancourt,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
It is the Company's contention that the grievant was properly
suspended for three days (July 2, 3 and 4) for reporting to work
under the influence of alcohol; for boisterously using foul and
obscene language; and for angrily kicking a work chair some distance across the factory floor.
The Company has proved the last item in the charge, but not
the first two.
Its evidence on the charge that the grievant was under the
influence of alcohol is limited to testimony by a supervisor that
he smelled alcohol on the grievant's breath; and that the grievant ' s uncharacteristic anger and boisterousness and the fact that
three months earlier he displayed similar symptoms when he was
under the influence permit a logical and reasonable conclusion of

-2being under the influence when he began his work shift on July
2nd.
With the burden on the Company to prove the allegations by
clear and convincing evidence, I find the foregoing factors to fall
short of establishing that the grievant was intoxicated.

Alcohol

on the breath means, of course, that alcohol was consumed sometime
earlier.

But it does not mean that the employee is intoxicated.

Here, the grievant admitted to having a beer in the afternoon at
home before he came to work.
that.

There is no work rule prohibition to

Probably he had more than one, and that would account for

alcohol on his breath.

But there was no testimony regarding the

condition of his speech, his eyes, his gait, or any of the other
traditional conditions that should be relied on in establishing
intoxication, short of a blood or other scientific test.

Here, no

such tests were administered.
I think it significant that the grievant's supervisor testified that he smelled alcohol on the grievant's breath when the shi|t
began.

Yet he didn't relieve the grievant of duty then but went

forward with assigning him work.

I deem that to be evidence that

the supervisor did not think then that the grievant was intoxicated,
his alcoholic breath notwithstanding.
The grievant's anger, manifested by loud "cussing" could be
a symptom of intoxication, but not conclusively.

The grievant

testified that when he arrived for work, his machine and work station had been left in disarray by the day shift operator; that this
had happened several times before; that it made it difficult if
not impossible for the grievant to know "where the day shift had
left off;" and that he, the grievant, "blew off steam" at that
condition.

In the absence of other traditional evidence of

intox-

ication and in the absence of any refutation of the grievant's

-3testimony regarding the condition of the job as he found it, I
cannot conclude that his anger and profane language was due to
the influence of alcohol.
Also, that on a prior occasion the grievant acted similarly
when he was intoxicated is not the kind of probative evidence to
prove intoxication this time.

It is a "bootstrap" argument that

does not meet the requisite test of "clear and convincing."
There is no evidence in the record that the grievant used
"obscene" language, or that anything he said was directed to anyone.

The testimony is that he said "son of a bitch" and "God

damn."

Neither phrase, although not of the highest civility, is

hardly surprising or unusual in a factory, and I do not think that
they fall within a category of the "obscene."

More importantly,

it is clear that the grievant was talking aloud, to himself, to
his machine and to his work area.

He was not talking to or direct

ing his anger or words to supervision or any other employee.

So,

though he was loud and angry I do not find that the circumstance
rose to the level of an "obscenity" or to the type of misconduct
which the Company alleges.
However, he did act out his anger by kicking a chair or
ladder.

And he did so with considerable force, causing the object

to travel along the factory floor.
ment was broken or destroyed.

Nobody was hurt and no equip-

But the potential for injury to

other personnel and equipment is obvious.

That type of violent

behavior is a safety hazard and need not be tolerated.

For that

act, some penalty is warranted.
Though the Company claims that the grievant was suspended
for three days, the grievant does not claim back pay for the first
day, July 2nd.

He asserts that he voluntarily left that day with

Company permission, so that pay for that day is neither warranted

-4-

or sought.
As the Company has not proved the intoxication charge or
the full magnitude of the charge of misconduct regarding the use
of loud and obscene language, but has proved the grievant's misconduct regarding kicking the work chair or ladder, I shall reduce the remaining two day suspension to a suspension of one day,
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the July 2, 3
4, 1986 suspension of Gilman Vaillancourt.
has waived any claim for pay for July 2nd.
remaining two day suspension is reduced to
day suspension and his disciplinary record
be adjusted accordingly. He shall be paid
one day.

and
He
The
a one
shall
for

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 2, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Connecticut State Employees Association,
Engineering, Scientific & Technical Unit
P-4

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1230 0269 87

and
State of Connecticut

This is a statutory "last best offer" arbitration of
those terms and conditions of the new contract between the abovenamed parties, which the parties were unable to resolve by direct
bargaining.
Commendably, the parties, hereinafter referred to respectively as the "Association" and the "State," resolved all issues
and terms and conditions of employment for the new contract except two.
Those two, which are the subject of this arbitration involve Parking and an Alternative Work Schedule.
Hearings were duly held in Hartford, Connecticut, at which
time representatives of the Association and the State appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record

was taken and both sides filed post-hearing briefs and reply memoranda.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Based on the entire record before me and with due consid-

eration of the statutory factors set forth in Public Act 86~411
Section 5-276A, Connecticut General Statutes, I conclude that the
"more reasonable last best offer proposal" on the Parking issue
is that of the Association and the "more reasonable last best
offer proposal" on the Alternate Work Schedule issue is that of

-2-

the State.
I am not persuaded that the State has shown a present
need to change or discontinue the parking provisions of the predecessor contract.

Its concerns about the adequacy of parking

space relate, speculatively to the future.

I am not able to

conclude that its predictions for the future will obtain or obtain to the magnitude asserted.
That being so, I find no convincing basis to eliminate
from the new contract the parking provisions of the predecessor
contract.

If the difficulties predicted by the State come to pass

in the next few years, the next round of bargaining (and arbitration if needed) will be the appropriate forums for remedial action
Not so speculative however is the State's objections to
each and all of the Association's proposals for Alternative Work
Schedules.
It is clear that alternate schedules comparable to the
Association's proposals herein have been implemented for other
bargaining units and for other departments of the State government.

It is also undisputed that those schedules, for the most

part, have worked satisfactorily.

I am also persuaded that alter-

nate work schedules have been well received by the affected employees, have improved employee morale and with staggered hours
and/or a shorter work week have produced travel conditions and
other conditions of employment highly desireable to the employees.
Those are important considerations, but I agree with the
State that they are not exclusively determinative.

I agree with

the State that bargaining units and the services they and their
departments perform are different, and that in terms of work productivity, delivery of governmental services and interaction with

-3-

vendors, contractors

and the public, more significant, and hence

determinative, is the impact of an alternate work schedule on
those latter duties and functions.
In the instant case I am not prepared to dispute or disregard the evidence adduced by the State that the proposed alternate work schedules would conflict and be incompatible with the
hours and days of work of private contractors working on the
State's highways and other projects, resulting in dislocations
in the needed coordination of the work of the employees of this
bargaining unit and those outside personnel.
I think it reasonable to conclude that the absence of
such worktime match would result in inefficiencies and additional overtime costs to the Departments of Transportation and Public
Works, who must rely on the services and availability of many
numbers of this bargaining unit.
In my view, that is the determinative fact.

I would

support the proposals on the grounds of morale, more pleasant
travel conditions, the improved effect on rush hour traffic, and
the advantages of an additional day off (in the case of the proposal for a four day week) if there was no adverse impact on
productivity and the regular delivery of affected governmental
services.

Here, I will not substitute my judgment for the essen-

tially unrefuted evidence by the State that there would be such an
adverse impact.
Therefore, I deem it proper that at present at least, an
alternate work schedule be introduced only if agreed to bilaterally.

At this juncture, I do not think that the Association's

proposals can be supported by an arbitration order as "more
reasonable" within the statutory meaning and intent.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and

-4-

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1. The current language on Parking, namely
Article 33 of the predecessor contract,
shall be continued and maintained in the
new contract.
2. There shall be no provision in the new
contract regarding Alternate Work Schedules.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 7, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electronic,
Electrical, Technical, Salaried
and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO and Its Local 313

OPINION

AND

AWARD

Grievance No. C889

and
Dresser-Rand Company

DECISION OF THE BOARD OF ARBITRATION
A hearing was held upon the above-captioned grievance on
July 7, 1987 at which both the Union and the Company presented
witnesses in support of their respective positions regarding the
grievance.
16, 1987.

A meeting of the Board of Arbitration was held October
This Award is rendered by the Board of Arbitration,

with dissents as to portions of this Award, as noted below, pursuant with the provisions of Section 33 of the collective bargaining agreement.
ISSUE
The parties at the hearing could not reach agreement as to
the issue to be submitted for decision.

However, it is clear that

the parties seek a resolution as to the interpretation of past
practice and potentially conflicting language in the collective
bargaining agreement regarding the vacation eligibility of laidoff bargaining unit employees.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
The Union relying upon a statement in Section 14(N) of the
collective bargaining agreement contends that

"notwithstanding"

anything to the contrary within the agreement an employee who
works 900 or more hours in

any calendar year is entitled in the

next calendar year to vacation whether or not he works during the
next calendar year.
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The Company, on the other hand, maintains that this is contrary to past practice and the language contained within Section
14(D)

which requires employees to have worked 900 hours within

the past 12 months and be on the active payroll just prior to
taking vacation.

The Company argues that only those employees

who (1) were employed on January 1, 1987 and had worked 900 hours
during the prior year or (2) who are on the

active payroll at

the time of requesting vacation and who worked 900 hours during
the preceeding 12 months are entitled to vacation pay.
further points to certain changes in Section 14(D)

The Company

in the last

negotiations, as well as Union proposed changes to this section,
to bolster its position that the Union's interpretation is incorrect and improper with respect to the meaning of Section 14(N).
Although the Union concedes that there has been a practice as
described by the Company, it contends that this clause, although
included in the agreement for many years, has never required interpretation until now due to the steady employment which the Company
has in the past been able to provide.

However, with the recent

layoff of large numbers of employees for extended periods of time
this has lead to a denial of vacation benefits to a large number
of laid-off employees.

Thus, the Union now seeks to enforce its

interpretation of the meaning of Section 14(N) and recover vacation
pay for those laid-off employees denied vacation pay at least since
the filing of this grievance.
DECISION AND AWARD
There is no question that there has existed for many years
a practice consistent with Section 14(D)

with respect to the pay-

ment of vacation pay to bargaining unit employees.

However, this

practice is not necessarily consistent with the language of Section

-314(N).

Neither party has offered any explanation to resolve the

potential inconsistency.

Thus, without such guidance one must

interpret the language in a manner consistent with other provisions of the agreement wherever possible.

The language of

14(N)

which, in my opinion, must be given a meaning is inconsistent with
the current practice with respect to how bargaining unit employees
become eligible for vacation benefits.
made between 14(D)

and 14(N)

A reconciliation can be

if one is to apply a similar pro-

cedure as set forth for employees on "RDE" status as described in

Accordingly, I find that employees presently on layoff status
and those employees who are laid-off in the future shall have their
vacation eligibility frozen at the time of layoff.

At time of

future recall their eligibility for vacation shall be calculated
based upon the prior 12 months previous to layoff without consideration in the calculation for the time while on this current layoff.

Section 14(D) will be applied without consideration for the

time while the employee was on the layoff from which he has most
recently been recalled.
Thus, an employee who had worked the requisite number of
hours to be eligible for vacation in the calendar year of layoff,
will upon recall in a subsequent calendar year be immediately
eligible to take vacation-consistent with the proviso in Section
14(J)

that an employee upon recall may not receive vacation for

30 days unless agreed upon by his Supervisor.

On the other hand,

if the employee is recalled with sufficient work hours during the
12 months just prior to the current layoff, the vacation eligibility hours will be calculated as provided in Section 14(D)

discount-

ing the months while the employee was in the current layoff status.
In no event will an employee be entitled to receive during any

-4one calendar year more vacation pay than his or her service would
entitle.
In view of the consistently applied and the long established
past practice, I find no basis to award, as the Union seeks, vacation pay to those employees who in the past have been denied vacation pay due to practices inconsistent with the Board's ruling.
My ruling is to have prospective application only.

DATED: October 17, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
The Union Arbitrator joins the decision with respect to my
AWARD of the prospective vacation eligibility but dissents as to
the denial of vacation pay to employees previousl adversely
affected.

DATED: October

1987

COTN?Y°OF
LOUNiY Oi<

)
;ss':

Rand Little
Union
Arbitrator

I, Rand Little do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
The Company Arbitrator dissents as to first -finding eligibility for vacation pay and joins with respect to the denial of
back pay.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1987
)
)

Donald Miller
Company Arbitrator

I, Donald Miller do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
- and - LOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702,

I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION

and

AND

AWARD

Du Art Film Laboratories

The stipulated issues are:
1.

Did the Company, in effecting layoffs in the
negative workers department violate the collective bargaining agreement by laying off
Lisa Chrystal and retaining Robert Mathias,
a less senior employee? If so, what shall be
the remedy?

2.

Did the Union violate Article 15 by posting
a certain notice on July 20, 1987 and by taking other related actions? If so, what shall
be the remedy?

A hearing was held on August 7, 1987, at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

ISSUE NO. 1
I find no need to decide whether the enumerated
jobs or functions set forth on page 43 of the contract under the heading Negative Workers Department
are separate classifications, or a single classification of a negative worker with different duties at
differing rates of pay.
Also, I need not decide whether the contract or
past practice relating to whether layoffs are by
seniority within a department or within a classification .
The disagreements between the parties on these
matters are pre-empted, in my view, by the undisputed operational and business needs of the Employer in this particular circumstance.
The undisputed facts show that Robert Mathias
was capable of and performed duties under category
(e), negative cutting and matching as well as work
under category (b) as a negative worker. And that
the grievant, Lisa Chrystal, was not capable of

-2performing the duties under category (e) and
was confined to the work of a general negative
worker under category (b).
The record also establishes, significantly,
that the Employer experienced a fall-off in the
work performed by general negative workers but
that negative cutting and matching work remained.
In the absence of a specific contract provision
requiring layoffs strictly on a seniority basis,
without any consideration of "ability," I deem it
axiomatic that where a junior employee is laid
off, the retained senior employee(s) must be able
to perform the remaining available work.
Here, there is no such contract provision. Indeed Section 7(a) of the contract requiring rotation of the available work amongst qualified employees within the classification affected, when
less than a full weeks work is not available, confirms that principle, and I deem that Section (c)
(1) is founded on the same principle.
In short, in both reduced workweek situations,
and in layoffs because of reduced work, coverage
of the available work by qualified employees is
mandated, and reductions in force are made in
classifications or duties where the work has fallen
off.
The Union's reliance on a past practice to the
contrary is not controlling.
It has not been shown
that in those instances, where the junior employee
in a department was excessed, the remaining available work could not be performed by the retained,
senior employees.
But in the instant case, had Mathias been laid
off and the grievant retained, the available work
of negative cutting and matching could not have been
handled. I find nothing in the contract or in past
practice that contemplates or supports any such result
Therefore the Union's grievance is denied.
ISSUE NO. 2
The Employer complains that on July 20th, the
Union's steward posted a notice that was designed
to instruct employees (and Union members) to defy
certain Employer actions. The Notice read:
Dear Member:
The Officers and Executive Board hereby
notify the members of 702 that during
short time there will be no temporary
transfers, no overtime, and no jobs performed by Supervisors.
Any violations of this should be reported to a Union official immediately.

-3Fraternally yours

Steve Perdikakis
Secretary-Treasurer
The Employer also calims that on the same night
the steward (Mr. D. Mercuric) twice threatened an
Employer Supervisor, that he would order members
not to carry out work assignments if the Employer
took certain actions.
At the hearing, this Arbitrator advised the Union
that the Notice could be construed by employees as
a Union directive to defy Employer orders and work
assignments, and that it therefore violated Article
15 of the contract. The Arbitrator instructed
Steward Mercuric to call the shop and have the
Notice removed. Mercuric complied with the Arbitrator's instructions.
There was no denial of the allegations that
Mercuric threatened supervision that work assignments would not be carried out. I find that too
was a violation of Article 15 of the contract.
As a remedy, I shall reiterate what I said in my
arbitration decision of October 8, 1970, between
the Union and Deluxe General. I make that decision
as set forth below, the concept of which I have time
and again stated is binding industry-wide,
applicable to the collective bargaining relationship between the Union and DuArt:
An employee must perform a work assignment or an order from the Employer even
if he or the Union believes it to be in
violation of the contract or any other
agreement between the Union and the
Employer.
The right of the employee and/or the Union is
under the grievance procedure of the contract.
In other words, the employee must perform the work
assigned, subject to his right and the right of
the Union on his behalf to complain to the permanent Arbitrator, subsequent to performing the
assignment, that it is in violation of the contract,
and to seek whatever remedy or relief would be
appropriate.
The intent of this directive is to make clear to
the parties that the permanent Arbitrator believes
that work assigned and orders given must be performed and carried out by the employee so assigned
or directed whether or not in violation of the contract, subject to his right to thereafter grieve before the permanent Arbitrator.

-4The only exception to this well settled rule
is when the assignment would place the employee
in physical jeopardy or when the assignment is
illegal or unsocial.
Violations of the foregoing will justify
discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: August 17, 1987
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OCAW Local 8~397

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. 28~86
FMCS No. 86K/22753

and
GATX Terminals Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
"Was the grievant, Joseph Medwick, suspended
for just cause on June 5th, 1986? If not,
what is the appropriate remedy?"
A hearing was held in Carteret, New Jersey on December 29,
1986 at which time Joseph Medwick, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were offered fully the opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and the Union and the

Company filed post-hearing briefs or memoranda.

The parties

waived the Arbitrator's Oath.
Provisions of the Employee Handbook and of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the Parties.
The Employee Handbook, which was promulgated by the Company, provides in pertinent part:
"Safety Standards, Rules and Disiplinary
Guides:
The following Conduct or Activity is
Prohibited:
....S-5. Reporting for work or attempting to carry on work while under the influence of liquor, illegal drugs or other
substance impairing judgment while in the
terminal. -"•

1. The Handbook provides that the penalty for the first violation
of S~5 is a 5 day suspension.

-2General Conduct Standards
The following Conduct or Activity is Prohibited :
....C-11. Use of obscene, abusive or
threatening languange or conduct directed
toward a foreman, supervisor, fellow employee or customer representative (including truck drivers)^
The relevant provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union and the Company provide in pertinent part:
ARTICLE 24
SUSPENSIONS AND DISCHARGES
Section 1. In cases in which the Company determines that an employee's conduct or performance
of work justified suspension or discharge, he
shall first be definitely notified by the foreman of his suspension or discharge in the presence
of the Terminal Manager (or his representative)
and the Chairman of the Workmen's Committee or a
member of the Workmen's Committee. The reason for
the suspension or discharge shall be given to the
employee and the Chairman of the Workmen's Committee
or a member of the Workmen's Committee. Upon
notification the employee shall immediately leave
the premises of the Company.
Section 2. If an employee believes his suspension or discharge is unfair or unjust, he may
within twenty-four (24) full and consecutive
hours, eclusive of non-workdays, Sundays and
holidays, after receiving notification, file a
grievance in writing and request processing of
such grievance in Step 3 of the adjustment procedure. A meeting between the Terminal Manager,
or his authorized representative, and the Workmen's Committee shall be held in Step 3 within
forty-eight (48) full and consecutive hours, exclusive of non-workdays, Sundays and holidays,
after the filing of the written grievance....

2. The Handbook provides that the penalty for the violation of
C-11 can range from "Suspension to discharge depending upon the
full circumstances.
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ARTICLE 2
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Section 1. Management rights of the Company
shall without limitation be solely and exclusively retained by the Company, except as
specifically and to the extent limited by
this Agreement.
Background Facts
The grievant has been employed at the Company's Carteret
terminal for about thirty years.

For the last fifteen to eighteen

years he has worked as a dockman whose responsibilities include
docking and hooking up the hoses which transfer products between
the Company's terminal and the barges and ships which deliver and
pick up the products.

He is considered by all concerned to be a

knowledgeable and competent worker. He is also generally known as
a person who tends to "speak his mind."
The grievant was scheduled to work a shift which began at
midnight, June 4, 1986 and was to end at 8:00 A.M. on June 5, 1986
During the week immediately prior to June 4, he worked about 106
hours, including 40 consecutive hours which he had completed at
8:00 A.M. on June 4.

In accordance with past practice, he re-

ported for work at about 11:00 P.M. on the evening of June 4.
He admitted that he had consumed "a couple of beers" at about
9:30 to 10:00

P.M. on the night in question and that he felt very

tired because of the long hours he had put in during the preceeding week.
On the day in question, John White was acting as shift
supervisor for the 4:00

P.M. to midnight shift.

joined the Company about three months earlier.

o

Mr. White had
He observed the

3. Mr. White testified that he had been in a training program
until the end of May.
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grievant as the latter clocked in and concluded from the grievant's
behavior that he was intoxicated.

White then asked John Brohl,

the pumphouse supervisor, for a "second opinion" on the grievant's
condition.

Brohl went into the locker where the grievant was

changing into his work clothes and concluded that the grievant
was intoxicated.

He then told the grievant to go home, although

the grievant denied that he was intoxicated and offered to go to
a nearby hospital to take a blood alcohol test.
was leaving the premises, he passed White.
at

As the grievant

He pointed his finger

White and said "Your ass is mine." Although no one took

any steps to avoid or prepare for a physical confrontation at that
time, White said that he believed that the words, tone and manner
conveyed a threat.
ceded.

Brohl, a witness to this event, then inter-

After some discussion and argument the grievant left work

in his own car.

On his way home, at about midnight, he went to

a bar and met Joseph Welusz, the President of the local union,
and commenced a conversation with Welusz about that evening's
events.
The next morning David Schultz, the Terminal Superintendent
received a report from Mr. Kadel, the Assistant Operations Manager
concerning the incident which occurred the previous night.

He

then spoke to White and Bohl about the events in question and informed Stephen Surto of the results of his discussions.

Surto

contacted Brohl and White and decided to suspend the grievant indefinitely pending further investigation.

Surto then telephoned

the grievant to advise his of the suspension.

The grievant went

to the terminal and met with Welusz who then called Mr. Surto and
requested an immediate meeting.
meeting was not possible.

Surto responded that an immediate

Welusz then told Surto that he wanted

a decision on the suspension in writing as soon as possible so

-5that he could respond with a grievance and have a Step Three meeting within the time set forth in Section 2 of Art. 24 of the collec
tive bargaining agreement between the parties.

Surto then relayed

the information to Ernest D. Erdelyi, the Company's Terminal
Manager.

Erdelyi then decided to suspend the grievant for ten

days for violations of Sections S~5 and C-ll of the Employee's
Handbook.

In deciding upon the appropriate punishment, Erdelyi

also took into consideration the grievant's prior years of service
and his job performance.

In addition, he also considered a prior

incident which occurred between a year to a year and one-half
earlier.

The grievant had "chased" an Exxon representative from

one of the Company's docks and in the process had used profanity
towards the customer's representative.
oral warning for this prior incident.

The grievant received an
While Erdelyi could not

testify as to the precise effect the prior incident had on his
decision to suspend the grievant for ten days, he conceded that it
had some effect on his decision although not an overriding one.
Erdelyi told Surto to inform the grievant of the decision.

A

grievance was filed and a Step Three meeting was held then next
day.
The Disputed Facts
The Company and the Union offered conflicting testimony as
to whether the grievant was in an intoxicated condition when he
reported for work on the evening of June 4.

Brohl testified that

he first encountered the grievant outside the entrance door and
informed him about a work related matter.

Brohl stated that the

grievant shrugged his shoulders and said "what else is new" and
proceeded inside.

He testified that the grievant appeared "clumsy

even though he wasn't paying too much attention to him at that time
On cross-examination he stated for the first time that the grievan :

was "weaving" a little bit as he climbed the entrance steps.
On the other hand, Brohl testified that the grievant gave the
impression of someone who was "just rolled out of bed ... being
tired and just slouching your way inside."

The grievant denied

any encounter with Brohl as he entered the terminal to report for
work.
White testified that after clocking in, the grievant hit
the locker room door with his right shoulder and bounced off the
wall on the right-hand

side.

The grievant denied that he ever

banged into the door.

Instead, he testified that the door was

almost always left open and that he was "pretty sure" it was open
• on the evening of June 4.
Brohl testified that after observing the grievant in the
locker room at White's request he concluded that the grievant was
totally intoxicated.

The bases for his conclusion were that: (1)

he smelled "hard liquor" on the grievant's breath; (2) the grievant ' s speech was slurred and (3) the grievant's general demeanor
was consistent with intoxication.

Brohl stated that the grievant

denied that he was unfit for work and offered to go to the hospital for a blood alcohol test.

Brohl decided not to accept the

grievant's offer because "he didn't want to take responsibility
of putting the man on the road in that condition."

Yet, Brohl

admitted he knew that sending the grievant home would also put him
on the road.

Brohl also testified that he did not notice any ob-

jective manifestation's of the grievant's alleged intoxicated
condition during the confrontation with White which occurred only
a few minutes later.

Brohl stated that at those moments, he

wasn't paying attention as to whether the grievant was or was not

4. Brohl didn't use the word "weaving" in his written report of
the incident. He stated only that grievant appeared "clumsy."
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intoxicated.
The grievant denied he was intoxicated.

He admitted he

had "a couple of beers" about an hour before he reported to work
and testified that he was very tired and that he so informed
Brohl during their locker room conversation.
a co-worker,

Richard

Brodniak,

testified that he observed the grievant during the

confrontation with White.

Brodniak concluded that the grie-

vant "looked tired but wasn't drunk" and that he always drank
beer, rather than hard liquor.

Welusz, now president of the local

Union and the chairman of the grievance committee at the time of
the incident in question, also testified regarding this issue.

He

stated that he met the grievant at a local bar about one hour afte
the grievant left the terminal and had a conversation with him about the events of that night.

Welusz testified that the grievant

did not appear drunk or intoxicated; that he had been drinking
with the grievant many times before and that, to his knowledge,
the grievant always drank beer and not hard liquor.
There was also a conflict in the testimony relating to
the confrontation between the grievant and White.

The grievant

admitted that he pointed his finger at White and told him "Your
ass is mine."

However, he testified that he only meant that he

would no longer give assistance in the performance of White's
supervisory job responsibilites.

Indeed, the grievant testified

that he "explained" his language in the presence of White immediately after he stated "your ass is mine."
the grievant's testimony.

Brodniak corroborated

On the other hand, the grievant admittec

that he was a "little angry" with White and that even his statement as explained was not a "proper statement."
admitted on cross-examination

Brodniak also

that the grievant seemed angry at
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White and that his tone was "a bit louder than a normal tone."
Both White and Brohl denied that the grievant attempted
to explain what he meant by "Your ass is mine" in front of White.
Brohl testified that the grievant's first attempt at such an explanation occurred a few minutes later in a conversation between
the two in the old lunchroom.-^

Brohl also testified that the

grievant also mentioned a prior incident between White and the
grievant relating to the failure of White to give the grievant
adequate notice to report to work on an emergency basis.
White further testified that at no time prior to June 4
had he worked with the grievant and that the grievant never "covered" for him or helped or assisted him.

The only prior contact he

had with the grievant was during the preceding week when he called
him in for some overtime work.

The grievant testified that he

had worked with White prior to June 4 because to some slight degree*
their shifts overlapped.

This Arbitrator then asked the grievant

to specify exactly the prior incidents which he believed constituted "covering up" Mr. White or "doing Mr. White's job."
Grievant testified that: (1) he often decided which hose should
be connected to the proper manifold and that White should have
been on the dock making that decision himself; (2) he signed a
"notice of readiness" which was the supervisor's job, although he
had been doing it for years for many other supervisors and (3)
White was constantly calling him and asking questions about which
berth was appropriate for a particular barge.

However, the grie-

vant was only able to pinpoint one specific incident by referring
to the name of the ship involved.

He could not recall the time

5. Brohl admitted that he did not transmit the grievant's explanation to anyone else. Brohl explained that he didn't remember grievant ' s explanation at the time he filed his written report.
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and dates of any other such incidents.
Lastly, there is some conflict in the testimony regarding
whether a written record was to be kept regarding the so-called
Exxon incident.

Erdelyi and Suto both testified that the grie-

vant was so informed at meeting between them, the grievant and
Welusz.

The grievant and Welusz denied that

mentioned that the incident would be recorded in

Erdelyi ever
writing.

Contentions of the Parties
The Union
The Union argues that the Company must satisfy its burden
of proving both infractions as set forth in the Violation Notice.
If any one of them fails, then the suspension was not for just
cause.

No evidence was adduced which could provide the Arbitra-

tor with any reasonable basis to uphold the suspension because
of a single violation or to trace the impact of one violation
on the decision to suspend for 10 days.

The Union also contends

that no other violation can be considered because neither Violation Notice nor any other written document contains a reference
to any other violation such as the Exxon incident.

Further, the

Exxon incident cannot be considered in determining the validity
of the instant suspension because neither the Union nor the grievant was informed that a written record thereof was to be included
j_n the grievant's personnel file.
The Union argues that the Company has failed to satisfy
its burden of proving that the suspension was for just cause.
First, the Union claims that the suspension was invalid because
of the Company's failure to abide by Article 24 Section 1 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.

That clause
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provides that the grievant "shall first be definitely notified
by the foreman of his suspension or discharge in the presence of
the terminal manager or his representative and chairman of the
Workmen's Committee or a member of the Workmen's Committee."
Even though Suto admitted that Welusz had requested such a meeting on June 5, none was held before the grievant received written
notice of the ten day suspension.
In addition, the Union argues that the Company's investigation was flawed since none of its representatives obtained the
grievant's version of the incident before a final decision was
made.

The Company official who made the decision did not even

know that the grievant had explained his "intent" to Brohl
immediately after stating to White that "Your ass is mine."
With respect to both of the alleged violations, the Union
contends that the Employees Handbook is not binding on the employees because it was never negotiated with the Union.
The Union further argues that the testimony fails to establish a violation of C-ll.
present when the

It points to the fact that no one

grievant told Mr. White "Your ass is mine" did

anything or made any movement in reaction to the so-called threat.
This belies the testimony of the Company's witness that White was
in fear for his physical safety.
meaning of C-ll must

Further, a threat within the

be of a "coercive character."

A threat not

to help White in the future is not within the meaning of the rule
and, in any event, was not the particular violation charged.

In

addition, both the grievant and Brodniak testified that the
grievant made it clear that there was no threat of physical
violence.

Moreover, the statement as explained was not a threat,

but only a warning or notification or promise as to the grievant's
future work plans.

-11With respect to the charge of reporting to work in an
intoxicated state, the Union contends that the testimony of
Brodniak and Welusz was unimpeached and entirely credible.

The

Union makes special note of the fact that the grievant voluntarily offered to take a blood alcohol test, but the Company refused to accept his offer.

The only explanation offered for

their refusal to do so is simply not credible.

The stated reason

was Brohl's desire to avoid putting the grievant on the road, but
at the same time he knew that the same risk was present in sending him home.

This impeaches Brohl's entire testimony and tends

to establish that Brohl sent the grievant home only as a show of
support to White, who was then a new shift supervisor.

Lastly,

the Union contends that a ten day suspension is unjust in light
of the grievant's

thirty-year record of competent employment

performance, unblemished but for the Exxon incident.

Indeed, the

severity of the punishment might well have violated the doctrine
of progressive discipline.
The Company
The Company argues that the Employee Handbook is binding
on all of its employees.

It points specifically to Article 2 of

the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.

That

clause retains to the Company "management rights" except as
specifically limited by the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

No

clause in that agreement purports to limit the right of the Company to promulgate the rules of conduct contained in the Employees
Handbook.
The Company emphasizes that it only has to demonstrate
that it has not been arbitrary and capricious, and only reasonable in its disciplinary decision.

Under this standard, the
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Arbitrator must uphold the Company's good faith conclusion that
the grievant was intoxicated.

The Company argues that the testi-

mony of Brohl and White, as well as the grievant's own admission
that he had a "couple of beers" and was very tired on the night
in question, establishes its good faith.
With respect to the charge of threatening a supervisor,
the Company relies upon the testimony of Brohl and White.

The

fact that no one took any action or steps to prevent physical
violence is simply irrelevant; White reasonably felt threatened
and so behaved after the incident.
related to future violence.

The threat might have well

The grievant's explanation of his

threat is simply not credible in light of White's testimony that
the grievant never worked for him and the grievant's own inability
to specify precisely a number of such incidents when he "coveredup" for White.

Moreover, even a threat not to assist a super-

visor in the workplace is a violation of C-ll.

Any doubts as to

the credibility of the witnesses should be resolved in favor of
the Company since the grievant is an interested party.
The Company argues that the ten day suspension is valid
whether or not the Company properly took into consideration the
Exxon incident because the events of June 4 by themselves are
sufficient to jusify the discipline.
in which the grievant

threatened

Indeed, the Exxon incident,
a customer representative with

the use of profanity, is directly relevant and supports the
decision to suspend the grievant for ten days.
a warning for similar conduct in the past.

He had received

Whether the warning

was oral or written is irrelevant.
Lastly, the Company disputes the Union's claims that the
suspension should be overturned because of the Company's failure
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to comply with Article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
First, the Company argues that no harm or prejudice was caused to
the grievant by the failure to abide by the letter of the contract
The grievant and the Union were promptly and officially

informed

of the indefinite and then the definite suspension and the reasons therefor.

The next day, the 3rd step meeting was held and

all concerned were given the opportunity to make their arguments
and set forth their versions of the events.

Second, the failure

to hold an initial meeting was caused by Welusz's insistence that
a final decision be made as soon as possible so that a step 3
meeting could be held on July 6.

Had the Union's President not

been so insistent, the initial meeting contemplated by Section 1
of Article 24 would have been held before the grievant had been
definitively notified of the terms of

his suspension.

Opinion
Before reaching the merits of the Company'sclaim that the
grievant violated S-5 and C-ll of the standards contained in the
Employee's Handbook, several preliminary matters must be determined.

First, I am persuaded that the Safety and General Conduct

Standards contained in the Handbook are binding on employees notwithstanding

the fact that it was not negotiated with the Union.

It is well established that absent any contractual restrictions,
management has the unilateral right to establish reasonable rules
regarding

and employee's workplace conduct.

The Collective Bar-

gaining Agreement between the parties neither expressly or impliedly establishes any limitations which would invalidate the
rules contained

in the Employee's Handbook.

Indeed, Article II,

Section 1 of the Agreement specifically reserves to the Company
"management rights... .without limitations" except as "specifically'.'
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and to the extend limited by this Agreement."
Second, the Company's admitted failure to comply with the
procedures set forth in Article 24, Section 1 of the Agreement
does not invalidate the suspension.

Whatever the justification

for the Company's denial of a meeting on June 5, witnesses for
both the Company and the Union have testified that it was the
Union who pressed for an early, definitive

decision and notifica-

tion with respect to the 10 day suspension.

Suto's uncontradicted

and unimpeached testimony indicates that but for the Union's request the Company would have complied with the requirements of
Article 24 by holding the required meeting on the following Monday
the first work day after the weekend.

The Union cannot be heard

to complain about the Company's failure to follow procedures when
the Union precipitated the Company's acts.

In addition, there is

no indication that the lack of the Article 24 meeting in any way
prejudiced either the grievant or the Union.

Both were informed

promptly of the precise nature of the charges and the punishment.
Both were given the opportunity to present their versions to the
Company at the Step 3 hearing which was held on Friday June 6,
only 48 hours after the alleged incidents in question.
In this regard, I also do not find that the Company's failure to learn of the grievant's version of the incidents invalidate
its action.

First, no clause or provision of the Collective Bar-

gaining Agreement purports to impose that duty upon the Company,

6. Suto's prior decision to suspend the grievant indefinitely
pending the outcome of the Company's investigation of the charges
against the grievant did not constitute "definitive" notification
of the suspension within the meaning of Article 24, Section 1. To
decide otherwise would be to assume that the Company could take no
interim steps to protect itself pending further investigation without reaching a "definitive decision on the violation and punishment
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Second, both the grievant and Welusz could have attempted to set
forth their positions to the Company in their conversations with
Suto which took place before Erdelyi made his decision to suspend
the grievant for ten days.
to do so.

Apparently, neither made any attempt

Third, the grievant and the Union took the opportunity

to set forth their versions by filing the written grievance and
by attending the Step 3 hearing which, as noted previously, was
held within forty-eight hours of the incidents in question.
Lastly, the Company's consideration of the Exxon incident
in no way adversely affects the validity of the suspension at
issue in this case.

This Arbitrator must assume that the verbal

warning issued to the grievant as a punishment for his prior actions was justified, since no grievance was filed to contest the
validity of that action.

The Company was clearly justified by

the doctrine of progressive discipline into taking into account
a prior violation of the grievant which involved similar conduct,
i.e. the use of profanity or obscene language to another.

Whether

or not the Union was told that a written record would be made of
the facts of the incident is irrelevant.

The Company would have

been justified in taking the Exxon incident into account had no
written record been kept particularly since the grievant himself
admitted that he used profanity in telling the Exxon representative
to leave the dock.
In any event, the present suspension can be judged based
solely on the events of June 4.

Although Erdelyi testified that

he took the Exxon incident into account, he was not asked whether

7. Thus, I find it unnecessary to resolve the conflict in the
testimony as to whether the Company informed the grievant and
the Union that a written record would be kept.
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he would have meted out a lesser punishment if he could not consider the prior incident.
Thus, the case turns on the questions of whether the Company has met its burden of establishing the grievant's violation
of S-5 and C-ll by clear, persuasive and convincing evidence.

A

careful and thorough review of the testimony and exhibits submitted
in this proceeding has persuaded me that the Company has not
satisfied its burden with respect to a violation of S~5, but has
with respect to a violation of C-ll.
S~5 of the Employee Handbook prohibits an employee from
"reporting for work or attempting to carry on work while under
the influence of liquor....or other substances impairing judgment
while in the Terminal."

Both White and Brohl testified that they

believed that the grievant was intoxicated.

I do not question

their credibility or their good faith in reaching that conclusion.
However, their testimony reflects only their lay conclusions which
were based upon their observations of the conduct and demeanor
of the grievant.

In my view, in order to prevail in this proceed-

ing the Company must provide by clear and convincing evidence that
the conduct and behavior which they observed were a result of
intoxication.

Their good faith belief that that was the case is

in itself not enough to prove a rule violation.

S~5 prohibits

reporting to work "under the influence of alcohol;" it does not
prohibit reporting for work in a condition which might create a
reasonable belief that an employee is "under the influence."
White's conclusion was based solely on his observation that
the grievant hit the locker room door and bounced off the wall.
Much of Brohl's testimony is also based in substantial part upon
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the grievant's "clumsy" and "weaving" physical behavior and
general demeanor, as well as his slurred speech.

Yet these

manifestations are also consistant with the behavior of a man
who had worked an enormous amount of hours the previous week,
including 140 consecutive hours which had concluded just fifteen
hours before he reported to work on June 4.

Indeed, even Brohl

admitted that the grievant gave the impression of someone who
"just rolled out of bed....being tired and just slouching...."
Brohl also admitted that during the confrontation with White,
which occurred just moments after Brohl's locker room meeting
with the grievant,

. he did not notice any slurring of speech

or other manifestation of intoxication.

Although Brohl testified

that he smelled hard liquor on grievant;s breath, beer and liquor
contain alcohol and a recent consumption of a non-intoxicating
amount of beer could well have left the smell of alcohol on the
grievant's breath.

Thus, even if the testimony of White and Brohl

were the only evidence submitted on the issue of intoxication, I
might well find that the Company did not satisfy its burden on
this issue.
There was, however, additional testimony supporting the
grievant's denial that he was intoxicated.

First, Brodniak, a

co-worker, testified that he observed the grievant moments after
his locker room conversation with Brohl.

Brodniak testified that

the grievant did not appear intoxicated.

More importantly, Welusz

testified that he had a long conversation with the grievant about
one hour after the incident in question and that the grievant was
not intoxicated.

Finally, all parties admit that the grievant

offered to undergo a blood alcohol test but that the Company
refused the offer.

While there may be valid reasons which support
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an employer's refusal to accept such an offer, none were given
in this case.

It's hard to understand why the offer would be

refused out of fear of allowing the grievant to drive to the
hospital in his alleged condition, and at the same time direct
the grievant to drive home.

In a case where the Company's other

evidence is inconclusive, and contrary evidence is unimpeached
and uncontradicted, the Company must bear the responsibility for
its failure to corroborate its management's conclusions through
the use of objective, scientific tests that are available.

Thus,

I find that the Company's determination that grievant violated
S~5 was not for just cause.
C-ll of the Employee's Handbook prohibits the "use of
obscene, abusive or threatening language or conduct directed towards....a supervisor."

The grievant admits he pointed his

finger at White and said "your ass is mine."

That he might not

have intended his statement as a physical threat is irrelevent.
Mr. White felt threatened and that reaction was a reasonable one
Q

in light of the language of the grievant's tone.
required to attempt to read the grievant's mind.

White was not
The fact that

no one present took any physical action to avoid an imminent
physical attack is also irrelevant.

No threat of immediate

physical danger is necessarily communicated by the words used.
The threat could well be meant or understood

as relating to future

physical attacks.

8. Grievant admitted that he was "a little angry with Mr. White"
and that his statement was no "proper." Mr. Brodniak also admitted the grievant seemed angry and that his tone was "a bit
louder than a normal tone." The grievant and Brohl testified
that the words were uttered in a very angry, threatening tone.
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The grievant testified that immediately after using the
threatening language, he explained to White, his real intentions.
He testified that he told White he would no longer "cover" or
assist White in the performance of his responsibilities.
corroborated

the grievant's testimony.

Brodniak

On the other hand both

White and Brohl testified that no such explanation was offered
in front of White.

The issue does not turn solely on the cred-

ibility of these witnesses.

First, I take notice of the fact

that the words "your ass is mine" are commonly understood as a
threat of physical violence.

It seems highly improbable that the

grievant would choose these words merely to indicated to White
that he was no longer going to receive job-related assistance.
Second, when the grievant was questioned by this Arbitrator to
state the exact dates and precise circumstances when the grievant
allegedly did White's work for him, all the grievant could state
was, with one exception, that at some unspecificed time and place
he responded to Mr. White's telephone requests for information,
signed "notices of readiness" (which he had done for many other
supervisors) and decided which hose should be connected to the
proper manifold.

Not only were the answers vague, but the ex-

amples included routine work within the grievant's responsibilities, and in total do not seem to me to constitute the kind of
"covering" or "assistance" to White, which if discontinued would
constitute a realistic threat.
In any event, C-ll does not prohibit only threats of
phsyical violence; it prohibits "obscene, abusive or threatening
language."
9. This interpretation is also corroborated by the paragraph on
page 2 of the Handbook which states in pertinent part: For example
if any employee uses profanity towards a foreman in private, the
offense is serious but no as serious as the use of the same words
in a loud and insulting tone before a large group of other
employees.
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There is no doubt that the grievant's words and conduct came within all three of these categories of prohibited activity.

The

Union's contention that the words or threats must be of a
"coercive" character is unsupported by anything in the record
and contradicts the plain meaning of the words of the Employee's
Handbook.

Equally unpersuasive is the Union's argument that the

Company must establish a threat of physical violence.

The "Viola-

tion Notice" stated not just that the grievant "threatened a
supervisor," but charged a "violation of rule...Oil in the Employ
ee's Handbook."

Thus, throughout these proceedings, the grievant

knew or should have known that his conduct had constituted violations of any and all of the activity prohibited by C-ll.

Accord-

ingly, I find that the Company's suspension of the grievant for
the violation of C-ll was for just cause.
There remains for determination the question of the
appropriate remedy since I have determined that only one of the
violations charged was valid.

The Company argues that the entire

ten day suspension be upheld on the basis of a violation of C-ll
since under the Employee's Handbook such a penalty was permissable
The Union argues that the entire suspension must be invalidated
as there is no way to prorate the length of the suspension.
find both arguments unpersuasive.

I

The Employee's Handbook spec-

ifies that a first violation of S-5 will result in a penalty of a
5 day suspension.

In the absence of contrary testimony, I must

assume that was the punishment imposed by the Company for the
alleged violation of S~5.

As that was not for just cause, the

grievant must be made whole for that five day suspension
attributable to this claimed violation.

The additional suspension

of five days for the proved violation of C-ll shall stand.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The ten day suspension of Joseph Medwick
was not for just cause. There was just
cause for a five day suspension. Therefore his suspension is reduced from ten
days to five days. He shall be made whole
for the difference.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 1, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
I.U.K., Local 320

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #15E300 0097 87

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of Sheri Braithwaite
on June 11, 1986 was for just cause. If
not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Syracuse, New York on March 25, 1987
at which time Ms. Braithwaite, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives
Company appeared.

of the above-named Union and

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed

post-hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged because the Company concluded
that she was an accessory to, had conspired in, or had specific
prior knowledge of her boy friend's plan to and his act of
physically assaulting employee Michael Evans with a tire iron.
The charge parallels a crime.

And though the criminal

standard of proof is not applicable in arbitrations, it is well
settled that offenses of such seriousness must be proved by
evidence that is substantial, clear and convincing.
The Company's case falls short of that standard.

There

is circumstantial evidence supportive of the Company's charge
and theoretically circumstantial evidence can be enough to meet
the standard.

But I cannot find, in this case, that it adds up

to connecting the grievant to the physical assault in the clear

-2and convincing manner required.
Though the grievant knew that her boyfriend (now her husband) would confront Evans, and though she may have threatened
Evans that her boyfriend "would get him," and even if she pointed
Evans out to her boyfriend as Evans left the plant, just prior
to the assault, I am not convincingly persuaded that she knew
that the confrontation would take the form of a physical assault
with a dangerous

instrument, or was a party to that type of

planned assault.
The fact is that the physical assault was committed by the
boyfriend, not the grievant.

The criminal complaint that fol-

lowed did not name the grievant, and she was not subject to any
criminal charge.
The grievant's explanation that she expected that her boyfriend would confront Evans and demand he stop spreading what
the grievant considered to be false and malicious rumors about
her in the plant, but did not see the tire iron and did not know
or condone physical violence, is plausible.

And the circumstan-

tial evidence, such as her threats to Evans, an ongoing feud between them, and her identification of Evans leaving the plant, do
not prove complicity in a criminal assault actually committed by
someone else.
I am not saying that the grievant did not know, condone or
even participate in the full extent of her boyfriend's plan.

In-

deed, I think the Company had reasonable grounds to so believe.
Rather, I am saying that the proof of a nexus between her complaints to her boyfriend about Evans; her words of threats to
Evans; together with her obvious expectation that some kind of
confrontation would ensue, and the actual physical assault with
a dangerous instrument, has not been shown by the evidentiary
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standard required.
But the grievant is clearly responsible for creating the
circumstances and "climate" which led to the assault.

Regardless

of the merits of her anger at Evans, her complaints about him to
her boyfriend obviously generated his anger at Evans.

She pro-

vided the elements of and set the stage for an inevitable end
result - namely some form of angry retaliation by her boyfriend.
Though humanly understandable, her conduct in that regard cannot
be excused.

It constituted negligence and recklessness.

If she though Evans was defaming her, she had other remedie
She should have complained to the Union and the Company and permitted the orderly processes of the grievance procedure and the
investigative methods of the Union and Company to work.
civil action for defamation was also available.

And a

A course of

conduct in the employment setting, under which physical violence
is a forseeable consequence is not permissable, and is a violation
of the Code of Conduct.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, I am constrained to
impose a severe disciplinary penalty, but short of discharge.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the discharge
of Sheri Braithwaite; but there was just
cause for a suspension.
Ms. Braithwaite shall be reinstated, but
without back pay. The period of time from
her discharge to her reinstatement shall
be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

DATED: May 26, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ' ''

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE Radio & Machine Workers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #52-E30-0515-86

and

General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
"Whether the discharge of Joseph (Jody) Brown
was for just cause? If not, what shall be the
remedy?"
Hearings were held in Louisville, Kentucky on February
13, 1987 and May 6, 1987 at which times Joseph Brown, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the
above-named Company and Union appeared.

All concerned were af-

forded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was

taken and the Union and Company filed post-hearing briefs.

The

parties waived the Arbitrator's Oath.
Provisions of the Appliance Park Rules of Conduct
The Appliance Park Rules of Conduct, which were promulgated by the Company, provide in pertinent part:
(2) Any single incident of misconduct, if
severe enough in the judgment of management, may result in discharge for just
cause.
(4) The following are typical examples of
the most serious offenses for which any
employee can be disciplined. This discipline, at the very least, will include
time-off and if considered serious enough
in the judgment of management, could subject the employee to discharge on the first
offense. In any case, a second act involving essentially the same offense within a
twelve month period will normally result
in a discharge.
.Theft, misappropriation or unauthorized

-2possession or removal of Company property or the property of others.

.Gross misconduct.

.Falsifying or forging any Company or
business related document such as employment or medical records, pay vouchers, clock cards, insurance or unemployment compensation claims, etc.
.Leaving the building, plant, or park without permission.
The Facts
The grievant began his employment at General Electric
Company in September, 1966.

At all relevant times herein, he

was assigned to Section 363-1 as an assembler on the gas dryer
line.
dryers.

He made vertical ducts which are components used in gas
The job is paid on an individual piece work (IPW) basis.

On occasion, as part of his job he was also assigned to the gas
dryer assembly line as a replacement operator.

While working on

his IPW tasks, grievant was expected to produce 89 pieces per
hour of work.

However, due to his skill and experience, and by

for going lunch and breaks, grievant was able to exceed the expected rate.

Rather than turning in to the Company on the days

they were made the ducts produced in excess over the expected
hourly rate he stored them as a "kitty."
On January 29, 1986, Company management personnel received
copies of an anonymous letter which accused an unnamed employee
of the theft of almost $70,000 of bearings.

The letter also in-

dicated that a foreman on the gas dryer line may have been an
accomplice.

The unnamed employee was described by job, height,

weight, physical appearance, neighborhood of residence and past
employment history.

Based upon that description, Bernard Boone,

-3the Manager of Shop Operations, identified the employee as the
grievant.

As a result, on January 30, 1986 the Company retained

Pinkerton, Inc. which then placed the grievant under 24 hour
surveillance.
On February 21, 1986, the Building Plant Accountant, Paul
Genari, reported a discrepancy between the reports of the
Pinkerton investigators and the grievant's time cards.

More

specifically, on 8 different days between February 4 and February
21, 1986, the grievant's time cards had been punched in at approximately 2:15 A.M., although the Pinkerton investigators reported
that they had observed him entering the plant between 5:45 and
6:00 A.M.

On these dates, grievant had been scheduled to report

in four hours earlier than his normal shift to produce additional
vertical ducts.

The grievant submitted vouchers on these eight

occasions which reflected that he did indeed work on his IPW job
for the additional four hours.

As a result he was paid premium

time (double time) on those days for those hours.

Company

officials concluded that the grievant had participated in a
scheme to defraud the Company by falsifying his clock cards and
pay vouchers to falsely reflect the hours which he worked.

How-

ever, the Company took no disciplinary action on February 21,
1986, even though Boone testified that he would have recommended
the grievant be discharged because of the falsification of his
clock cards and vouchers.

The reason offered for the lack of any

action at that time was that the Company did not wish to compromise the ongoing theft investigation by revealing the nature and
source of the surveillance of the grievant.
The Company's interest in the theft allegation against
the employee identified as the grievant, ended by March>

1986.

No evidence was found which in any way connected the grievant to

-4any such thefts.

However, by March 19, reports of the Pinkerton

investigators indicated that on eighteen different occasions the
grievant had actually reported for work almost four hours later
than his clock cards indicated and, accordingly, worked four
hours less than his vouchers reflected.

In addition, on March

11, 1986 a security guard posted by the time clock observed another employee, Paul Birkle, punching the grievant's clock card.
On March 19, 1986, a guard observed still another employee,
Kenneth Smith, doing the same for the grievant as well as a coworker, Rondell Riddle.
1986,

Further, on February 27 and March 5,

the Pinkerton investigators observed the grievant leaving

his job between 1-1/2 to 1 hour before the end of his scheduled
shift.

His clock cards for those dates, however, were punched

out at the end of the shift.
Lastly, the investigators noticed that the grievant had
possession of an inside parking sticker which allowed him to park
in a restricted area next to Building 1.

Company officials

asserted that he was not authorized to possess and use such a
sticker and in March of 1986 demanded its return.

After twice

refusing to return the sticker, the grievant did return it, or
its holder, to the Company.

However, the grievant had removed

the numbers from the center of the sticker.
On March 27, 1986, the Company discharged the grievant for
"gross misconduct."

More specifically, the grievant was discharged

for (1) falsifying his clock card on eighteen occasions by participating in an arrangement whereby others clocked him in during hours when he was not working; (2) falsifying his vouchers
on 18 occasions to reflect that he worked 12 hours per day (including four hours at double time) when, in fact, he worked no
more than 8 hours per day; (3) leaving work without permission
on two occasions and (4) misappropriating Company property by

r

failing to return the parking sticker with the numbers intact.
1
?
Three of grievant's co-workers- were also disciplined:
Kenny Smith was disciplined for punching-in grievant and Riddle
on March 19; Riddle was disciplined for participating in an
arrangement whereby Smith punched him in on March 19 during hours
when he was not at work; and Michael Blair was also disciplined
for some clock card violation.

Each of these workers were sus-

pended for more than a week, but less than a month.

None were

discharged, except for the grievant. 3
The usual punishment for a single time clock violation is
a week's suspension and a warning notice.

A person who punches

another's clock card when the latter is not at work is, of course,
also guilty of misconduct.

But it is explained that the former

is often punished, although the latter is not, because it is often
more difficult to prove the latter's intentional wrongdoing, i.e.
the person whose card is clocked will often deny that he authorized another to do so.

1.

A fourth worker, Birkle, was also disciplined for punching
the grievant's clock card on March 11.

2.

Grievant's foreman, Joseph Shewmaker, was also disciplined
for, among other things, failing to discover the time card
violations. He was put on one year's probation and received
not salary increase for two years.

3.

The record does not reflect the specific charge against Blair.
Indeed, it does not reflect the precise discipline meted out
to Smith, Riddle, Blair, or Birkle or the details of the
charges or proceedings against any of them. Apparently, this
gap in the record is a result of a compromise agreement between the parties which included a stipulation not to reveal
such information in this proceeding.
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Opinion

I find that the Company has met its burden of establishing the grievant's violation of three provisions of the Code of
Conduct by clear, persuasive and convincing evidence.

First,

the record clearly establishes that on eighteen different occasions between February 4 and March 19, 1986 the grievant's time
card was clocked in almost four hours before he actually came to
work.

The testimony of Dennis Smith, the Manager of Investiga-

tions of Pinkerton and the documentary evidence submitted herein
is unimpeached and uncontradicted.

Indeed, the grievant admitted

that on some occasions when he was supposed to start work at 2:30
A.M., in fact, he began somewhere closer to 5:00 or 6:00 A.M.
(Transcript at p.44) and the Union has not seriously contested
the facts (Union's Brief at p.5).

There is not substantial proof

that the decision to place the grievant under surveillance was
motivated by any personal animus.

Rather, the record reflects

that the Company merely took steps to investigate an allegation
that someone fitting the grievant's description had engaged in
a major theft of Company property.

The sheer number of occurrences

the fact that each falsification resulted in double time pay to
the grievant, the grievant's falsification of his pay vouchers
for these days by reporting the exact number of ducts expected to
be produced during additional hours, and his failure to deny any
of the facts lead inevitably to the conclusion that the grievant
was engaged in an intentional and knowing scheme to falsify his
time cards.

The fact that the Company received all of the vert-

ical ducts expected from the rate regardless, of the grievant's
falsified work hours is no excuse. The uncontradicted testimony of
Gary Wright, Manager of Manufacturing for Assembly, establishes that
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the grievant was paid on the basis of his falsified hours over
$600 more than he would have received for the same productivity
had his hours been truthfully reported.

The record reflects the

strong possibility that had grievant accurately reported the
number of ducts he produced when he actually produced them, there
might have been less need to call workers in early at double time
pay to maintain an adequate inventory.

Thus, the grievant's

knowing falsification of his time cards deprived the Company of
its benefit from the incentive work system and constituted, in
a sense, a wrongful taking of the Company's monies.
Second, I find that the Company has satisfied its burden
of proving that for the eighteen days at issue the grievant knowingly falsified his own vouchers.

On each of those days, the

vouchers reflected that the grievant worked the additional four
hours for which he was clocked in, but during which he was actually
not at his job.

As a result, he was unjustifiably paid more

money than he should have been and the general integrity of the
information on the vouchers, which is used by the Company for a
variety of important business purposes, was breached.
Third, I find that the grievant intentionally left work
early and without permission on February 27 and March 5, 1986.
The Company's evidence on these matters is also uncontradicted.
Indeed, the grievant admitted that there were occasions when he
left early without clocking out (Transcript

at p.74).

Although

his time cards were punched out at the end of his shift, I find
it unnecessary to determine whether grievant authorized someone
else to clock him out after he had actually left work.

The Code

of Conduct prohibits "leaving the building, plant or park

with-

-8out permission," regardless of any document falsification.

4

Lastly, the Company's decision to impose the penalty of
discharge for the grievant's conduct was not arbitrary or capricious.

The grievant's activity reflected dishonesty and dis-

loyality at worst, and, at best, a flagrant disregard for the
Company's work rules.
occurrences.

The violations did not constitute isolated

Rather they reflected an ongoing scheme to defraud

the Company into paying the grievant for hours he did not work.
Indeed, the Code of Conduct explicitly recognizes that an employee
can be discharged for any "single incident," if deemed serious
enough.

In this case, the grievant violated three sections of

the Code during the course of 38 incidents (18 time card violations; 18 voucher violations; and 2 instances of leaving work
without permission).

The totality of the circumstances negates

any charge that the penalty imposed was unduly harsh.
Thus, the Company has established its prima facie case
that grievant was discharge for just cause.

The Company's action

must therefore be affirmed unless the Union has satisfied its
burden of proving one of its three defenses; i.e. a denial of
due process, uneven or disparate treatment, or a violation of the
requirements

of progressive discipline.

A careful review of the

record and arguments of the parties has persuaded me that the
Union has not met its burden of proving any of these defenses.
The Union's claim

that the nature of the charge against

the grievant and the process of grievance resolution have resulted
in a denial of due process are unsubstantiated

both factually and

4. It is unnecessary to decide whether the grievant engaged in
the "misappropriation of Company property" by his failure to
return the parking sticker(s) with the permit numbers intact.
As there is no evidence that the grievant ever attempted thereafter to gain entrance to the plant or that the Company could
not otherwise protect itself against such an incident, any
violation would appear to be de minimus. Thus, I need not and
do not resolve the conflict in the testimony between the grievant and Elbert and McManigle that the latter authorized the
grievant to return the sticker without the numbers. Nor is it
necessary to resolve the parties' arguments relating to the
Union's contention that it was led to believe that the parking
sticker was no longer an issue in grievant's discharge.

-9legally.

First, any argument that the grievant did not know what

conduct was prohibited by the prohibition against "gross misconduct" is belied by the fact that the grievant violated and
was charged with violating three more specific work rules contained in the Code of Conduct.

He has not and cannot contend

that he did not know that falsification of time cards and vouchers
and leaving work before the end of his shift without permission
constituted violations of the Code of Conduct.

Second, the Union

has not succeeded in proving that a reasonable employee would not
have known that discharge was a possible punishment for the nature
and number of offenses committed by the grievant.

The evidence

establishes only that the usual or general penalty for a single
time card violation was a week's suspension and no witness could
recall any incident wherein an employee was discharged for a time
clock violation.

That evidence does not, however, satisfy the

Union's burden of proving that the grievant should not have reason-ably expected that discharge was a possible sanction for eighteen
time card and voucher falsifications, all of which were part of
an intentional scheme which defrauded the Company out of double
time pay.

In addition, the grievant also left work early on two

occasions without permission.

Further the Code of Conduct ex-

plicitly states that any single incident could result in a discharge.

Thus, any reliance by the grievant on the "general" or

"normal" punishment for the typical time card violation is unfounded and not factually related to his offenses.
Third, the Union's claim that the Company withheld

5. Thus, it is unnecessary to decide whether a prohibition against
"gross misconduct" is, standing alone, so vague and ambiguous
as to lack fair notice to employees.

-10significant information during the grievance process is substantially contradicted by the evidence and is, in any event, legally
irrelevant.

Boone testified for the Company that at a meeting of

March 20, 1986 he advised the grievant and Elbert that the grievant was charged with clocking in early on 17 to 20 occasions and
that Boone started to go through each such occasions when the
grievant left the meeting.

Boone also testified that at a March

24th meeting with the grievant, Elbert and Mitchell, Boone stated
that the grievant was accused of between 17 and 20 time clock
violations and that he went through the specific dates involved.
Boone also advised the grievant and Union officials of the charge
that the grievant left work early and without permission on the
two dates in question.

Mitchell essentially corroborated Boone's

testimony, except he denied that was advised of the specific dates
involved in the time card and voucher falsification charges.
Mitchell further admitted that he was advised that the witnesses
who observed the grievant coming into the plant were outside
contractors.
Essentially, the only information which was not transmitted
to the Union at the earlier steps of the grievance process was the
precise number of time card violations (18 rather than between 17
and 20), the identity of the observers, the details of their
method of surveillance and the reason for the initial decision to
place the grievant under surveillance.

The Company's failure to

disclose such information, although questionable and perhaps unfortunate as a matter of good labor relations does not, however,
constitute a denial of due process or fundamental fairness.

No

provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
parties obligates the Company to set forth all of the evidence
during the pre~arbitration grievance procedure.
of such a

In the absence

contractual obligation, the grievant and the Union are

-11only entitled to be protected against unfair surprise.

All the

information relating to the dates and times of the time card and
voucher violations were transmitted to the Union before the arbitration hearing.

The identity of the observers and method of and

motivation for surveillance, were, of course, revealed at the
hearings held in this proceeding.

Neither the grievant nor the

Union made any claim that they were unprepared to meet this evidence.

Indeed, this Arbitrator specifically advised the parties

that if the Union was surprised by anything offered by the Company
he would give the Union full opportunity to meet whatever it contended represented new information or new specifics that it did
not have available during the grievance proceeding.
at p.178).

(Transcript

The Union did not however, make any request for a

continuance during the hearings.

The Union's argument that it

lacked sufficient information to rationally decide whether to
pursue the instant grievance through arbitration is belied not
only by the evidence discussed above, but also by Mitchell's own
testimony that he voted to request arbitration of the matter because of the nature of the penalty, rather than by considerations
of grievant's guilt or innocence.

In any event, in this case the

Union did request arbitration and vigorously contests the propriety of the Company's action.

Thus, neither the grievant nor

the Union has suffered any harm because of any failure of the
Company to disclose any information at earlier steps of the grievance process.

6. Similarly, neither the Union or the grievant has proven any
prejudice which might have resulted from any statement by
Shewmaker to the effect that Elbert and Smith shouldn't "worry
about it." That statement is not enough to constitute a
settlement or a waiver.

-12The Union has also failed to prove that the discharge of
the grievant for the violations he committed constituted uneven
or disparate treatment.

That the general or usual penalty for

a time card violation was a week's suspension or that no witness
could recall an employee being discharged for such an infraction
does not constitute sufficient proof that the grievant was treated
more harshly than other similarly situated employees.

No witness

could even recall a disciplinary proceeding which involved time
card violations on multiple occasions, such as the instant proceeding, which involved eighteen such violations, eighteen voucher
falsifications and two occasions wherein an employee left work
early and without permission.

The Union offered no persuasive

evidence tending to prove that any other employee who committed
the number, nature and breadth of violations committed by the
grievant was treated more leniently.
Neither the testimony of Blair nor Riddle leads to a differ
ent conclusion.

Although both testified that they, and others,

had developed "kitties," the issue in this proceeding is not
whether having such a "kitty" violates Company work rules, at
least if it is significant enough in size.

The issue in this

proceeding is whether an employee on a continuous basis, could
lawfully build up a four hour kitty and then on eighteen days use
it to cover up the falsification of time cards to earn double time
pay for hours not actually worked.

All Company witnesses denied

7. Shewmaker testified that if a worker built up a 15 or 20
minute kitty which he didn't turn in on the day it was produced
he wouldn't "make an issue of it." He also testified that a
worker could usually use a small kitty to relax a bit on the
end of the shift during which the excess was produced.

-13knowledge or approval of any such practice.

Further, although

Blair and Riddle both testified that they committed the same
offenses as the grievant, but were not discharged, both admitted
that they denied having done so during the course of the Company's
investigation.

Not only do the inconsistencies cast doubt upon

the credibility of the witnesses' testimony, but the denials
deprived the Company of any

proof of their wrongdoing in terms

of the kind of multiple violations committed by the grievant.
Further, Riddle's and Blair's testimony that Shewmaker, the foreman, was aware of such practices is not credible.

Blair's testi-

mony that on one occasion he passed Shewmaker while driving on
Bardstown Road during hours when he was supposed to be at work
assumes that Shewmaker saw and recognized him and knew or should
have known that Blair was, at that moment, clocked in.

In addi-

tion, the testimony is undercut by Blair's failure to recall the
date, season or even the year when the event occurred.
testimony that Shewmaker

Riddle's

told him on one occasion not to come in

early as scheduled, but to ask someone to punch his card is also
not credible.

Riddle, as well as Blair, told Company officials

during the investigation that Shewmaker was not aware of any
falsification or mutual time card punching scheme engaged in by
the employees.

Shewmaker, and Boone, both denied any knowledge

of any such scheme, including denials that either noticed that
employees' air guns were not connected when they were clocked in.
The fact that Riddle told McManigle that on occasions the employees punched each other in does not constitute an admission
that on those occasions the employee whose card was punched did
not actually work, or that the "punch in" was designed to hide
the type, magnitude and exterisiveness of the course of conduct
engaged in by the grievant.

-14Thus, the Union has failed to demonstrate any disparate treatment
of the grievant, on the one hand, and Blair and Riddle on the
other.
Nor does the Company's failure to discharge Smith establish
disparate treatment.

Smith was observed punching in the cards of

the grievant and Riddle on March 19.

Even though Company policy

was to punish the "puncher" equally as the "punchee," the only
evidence the record reflects that the Company had against Smith
was his activities on a single occasion involving two employees.
That is a far cry from the evidence which establishes the grievant ' s activities and culpability.
Similarly, the failure of the Company to fire Shewmaker,
the foreman, is irrelevant to any claim of disparate treatment.
First, it is well settled than an employer may treat union employees and management personnel differently.

Second, Shewmaker

persuasively denied any knowledge of the falsification scheme,
and Blair and Riddle all supported Shewmaker's assertion during
the Company's investigation of the matter.

Thus, the failure to

discharge Shewmaker does not reflect any favoritism towards him
or animus towards the grievant.
Lastly, the Union has failed to offer any evidence tending to prove that the Company's actions were motivated by a
personal dislike of the grievant rather than by a good faith
attempt to enforce its work rules.

The fact that the grievant had

previously been disciplined for insubordination, but had obtained
a reduced penalty during arbitration, does not establish any
current animus towards him.

Nor is there any evidence that the

Company's actions were motivated by a previous verbal confrontation or an accusation of prior phsyical violence.
mere allegations, unsupported by probative evidence.

These are
The fact
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that only the grievant was placed under 24 hours surveillance is
adequately explained by the fact that the foreman alluded to in
the anonymous letter was not identified by any description and
that any investigation of the grievant might have led to the discovery of the identity of the foreman.

The pervasive nature of

the grievant's wrongdoing and the irrefutable proof thereof also
stands to negate any ill motive by Company officials.
Finally, the Union contention that the Company's action
violated the requirements of progressive discipline is without
merit.

Company officials first became aware of the grievant's

time card and voucher falsifications on February 21, 1986.
that time, eight such violations had already occurred.

By

The Compan^

did not, however, then discipline the grievant because of their
fear of compromising an ongoing investigation of a possible major
theft of Company property.

By March 19, 1986, the Company's

theft investigation was abandoned and shortly thereafter the
grievant was discharged.

By March 19th the grievant had committed

eighteen time card falsifications, eighteen voucher falsifications
and two violations of the rule which prohibited an employee from
leaving early without permission.

Clearly, as of March 19, the

Company was justified in discharging the grievant pursuant to the
express language of the Code of Conduct, as a result of the
seriousness of the totality of offenses committed by him.

Indeed,

the Company would have been justified in discharging the grievant
on February 21, as Boone testified he recommended, because of the
intentional eight time card and voucher falsfifications.

The post-

ponement of any discipline until the criminal investigation was
completed was a reasonable and even necessary step by the Company
to protect its business interests.

In any event, that postpone-

ment did not prejudice the grievant nor his case in arbitration,
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as he could and would have been discharged on February 21, 1986.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Joseph (Jody) Brown was
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 21, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, Local 715

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #53-E300 0329 87

and
General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Shirley Cmar on August
21, 1986 for just cause? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Cleveland, Ohio on October 20, 1987
at which time Ms.Cmar, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant
and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full oportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
filed a post-hearing

Both parties

brief.

This is a discharge case, with the burden on the Company to
establish its case.
"civil"

Also, as the parties well know it is a

and not criminal procedure, with the standard of proof

less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Considering

the entire record before me, together with the

requisite standard of proof, I am satisfied that the Company has
shown that the grievant falsified her production totals upward,
in violation of the Work and Conduct Rules.
particular circumstances

But, confined to the

of this case, I conclude that the pen-

alty of discharge was too severe.
Certain facts raise significant suspicions which point to
the grievant's culpability.

Among them is the fact that the pro-

duction she reported exceeded a physical count by supervision on

-2the four consecutive work days of August 15, 18, 19 and 20.

I do

not think that inadvertent errors can account for an "over report'
within such a consecutive proximate period.

Moreover, neither

the grievant nor the facts in this case provide an acceptable
explanation.
The fact that on a particular day, the grievant's report
exceeded an audit, and a claimed incompleted tray of "mounts"
inexplicably disappeared, raises suspicions.

Unless there is some

acceptable explanation for the disappearance of that partial tray,
other than the speculative and uncorroborated answer that it may
have been removed to be sealed, I find frailties in an argument
that it was part of the grievant's production on a day when what
she reported exceeded a physical count.
I am further suspicious because of the Company's testimony
that at certain times the grievant's operating partner in the work
process also reported more production than work tagged in her
name, and that a Company investigator concluded that the grievant' js
higher production was because she took as her own, some of her
partner's productivity.
My suspicions are aroused by the single incident of an
obvious erasure and overwriting a production tag, giving the grievant production credit (or a claim) for the work so tagged.
As I have stated, the foregoing has raised suspicions.

But

suspicions or speculative conclusions drawn therefrom are not
enough to support a finding of culpability.

And if this was all

there was to the Company's case, I would find that the Company's
burden of proof has not been met.
However, there is more.

I find this additional evidence and

testimony credible and determinative in support of the Company's
case and it represents the critical point that turns suspicion
and speculation into adequate proof.

-3It is the rebuttal testimony of fellow employee Shirley
Zele.

Her uncontroverted testimony was that when she worked be-

side the grievant (as a team partner in the operation) she suspected that the grievant took credit for some of her (Zele's)
work.

To confirm her suspicions she twice marked her own trays

with a colored crayon as well as her ticket.

The next day she

found the marked trays bearing the grievant's ticket.
This unrefuted testimony, when added to the foregoing

"sus-

picious" circumstances, plus the grievant's own admission that she
often retained some productivity "to carry over to the next day"
thereby providing inaccurate productivity reports for the two days
affected, leads me to conclude that the Company has satisfactorily
shown that the grievant willfully inflated her productivity on
the days and over the period charged.
However, the penalty of discharge should be reduced to a
disciplinary suspension for the following reasons, expressly
limited to the facts and circumstances

of

this case.

The griev-

ant had worked for the Company for fourteen years, and aside from
an attendance infraction has had a satisfactory disciplinary and
production record.
of offense.

Not before has she been charged with this type

Also, the specific days

on which her production re-

ports significantly exceeded the audit, immediately followed her
return from sick leave and should be viewed in the frame of another
proximate event - word from her supervisior that her production
had slipped below the expected daily productivity and that she had
to increase it.

I think it reasonable to conclude that her illness,

her slipping productivity and the fear generated by her supervisor!s
warning, caused her foolishly to inflate her production. This is
not to excuse her, but rather to point to a mitigating circumstance.

-4Additionally and importantly, the grievant did not gain
monetarily from her action.

She was not paid by the piece and

her pay did not vary by the quantity of her production.

Again

this does not excuse her but rather serves to reduce the impact
on the Company by her actions.

I recognize that false production

reports can be and are injurious to the Company and for that
severe disicipline is in order.

But in this case a lengthy sus-

pension for the period of time she has been out, is sufficient.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Shirley Cmar committed the work rule offense
charged. However the penalty of discharge is
too severe, under the particular circumstances
of this case. Her discharge is reduced to
disciplinary suspension for the period of time
she has been out. She shall be reinstated, but
without back pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 21, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s s - I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

ELECTION DEPARTMENT
-X

In the matter of
LOCAL 1199, DRUG, HOSPITAL
AND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES
UNION, RWDSU/AFL-CIO

CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS

13 50 0045 87
-X

Pursuant to a letter agreement dated October 27, 1987 and
signed by Sylvia Grant-Gutierrey, Vice President, Local 1199, Drug,
Hospital and Health Care Employees Union, RWDSU/AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as "Local 1199", the American Arbitration Association,
hereinafter referred to as the "Administrator", agreed to conduct a
referendum election.
Eric Schmertz, Dean, Hofstra University School of Law was
designated as the Special Master and Arbitrator to oversee the election.
On October 28, 29 and 30, 1987 all interested parties were
afforded the opportunity to view the list of eligible voters.
Local 1199 provided the Administrator with lists of persons
who were eligible to vote.
Seventy seven thousand one hundred eighty-eight (77,188)
ballots were mailed to eligible voters on Saturday, October 31, 1987.
During the course of the election, an additional two thousand one hundred ninety-five (2,195) ballots were issued at the request of Local 1199.
To be counted, ballots had to be received by the Administrator no later than 5:00 p.m., Friday, November 13, 1987.

LOCAL 1199, DRUG, HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES UNION,
RWDSU/AFL-CIO
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS
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Of the twenty seven thousand eight hundred twenty-seven
(27,827) envelopes received by the Administrator, eight hundred thirty-three (833) envelopes were neither opened nor counted for the following reasons:
680
3

No identification
Labels no signature

21

Ineligible

30

Eligibility challenged

15

Mutilated control number

5

Unidentifiable

6

Issued to one voter
returned by another

73

Not on list of eligible
voters (status verified)

In addition, the Arbitrator ruled that four hundred twelve
(412) envelopes be set aside for the following reasons:
18

Duplicates (9 sets of two
envelopes)

48

Hand delivered by persons
other than voters

37

Received in one envelope
via mail

83

Not on list of eligible
voters (status not verified)

138
88

Eligibility challenged
Issued to one voter
returned by another

The counting of ballots took place at the offices of the
Administrator, 135 West 50th Street, New York, New York on Saturday,
November 14, 1987 in the presence of observers.
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During the counting of ballots:
3

Envelopes were found to
be empty

10

Envelopes were found to
contain material other
than a ballot

1

Envelope was found to
contain two (2) ballots.
Inasmuch as both ballots
were voted the same, one
(1) ballot was counted.

Secrecy of the ballot was maintained at all times
The results are certified to be as follows:
TOTAL NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED:

26,569

You have previously received proposed
amendments to the constitution of Local 1199. If you approve the amendments mark an X in the YES box. If
you disapprove the amendments mark an
X in the NO box.
YES

13,884

NO

12,601

BLANK

35

VOID

49

Ballots were tallied by chapter.

To preserve the secrecy

of the vote the Arbitrator ruled that any chapter which had a return
of less than five (5) ballots each be counted and recorded as one
group.
In addition, the Arbitrator ruled that one hundred seventyfour (174) ballots be counted without chapter designation.
The chapter breakdown is as follows:
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

1002

446

183

262

0

1

1018

33

4

29

0

0

1035

20

3

17

0

0

1040

141

26

114

1

0

1045

37

21

16

0

0

1056

215

35

180

0

0

1065

880

448

431

1

0

1068

42

33

9

0

0

1077

155

45

110

0

0

1078

120

58

61

0

1

1083

253

126

126

1

0

1092

28

4

24

0

0

1099

691

647

44

0

0

1113

250

161

88

0

1

1122

139

11

128

0

0

1123

11

11

0

0

0

1126

43

31

12

0

0

1271

38

26

12

0

0

1272

12

4

8

0

0

2004

208

32

176

0

0

2009

73

22

51

0

0

2028

125

28

97

0

0

2043

72

8

64

0

0

2062

10

2

8

0

0

2069

921

484

434

0

3

2093

294

181

113

0

0

2164

130

14

116

0

0'
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

2208

12

12

0

0

0

2209

34

5

28

0

1

2214

11

5

6

0

0

2215

71

37

34

0

0

2217

13

11

2

0

0

2218

142

29

111

1

1

3001

179

36

142

1

0

3003

124

36

87

1

0

3004

8

7

0

1

0

3005

66

56

10

0

0

3007

102

31

71

0

0

3008

44

13

31

0

0

3009

47

23

24

0

0

3010

239

143

96

0

0

3011

54

32

21

0

1

3012

151

92

59

0

0

3013

283

148

133

1

1

3014

71

45

25

0

1

3016

18

15

3

0

0

3017

142

20

122

0

0

3018

153

57

96

0

0

3019

16

2

14

0

0

3022

166

65

99

2

0

3023

57

20

37 ,.

0

0

3025

9

3

6

0

0

3027

125

77

48

0

0

3028

102

70

32

0

0
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

3030

78

30

48

0

0

3031

180

91

89

0

0

3032

86

33

52

0

1

3033

38

13

25

0

0

3034

167

98

68

0

1

3035

144

96

47

1

0

3036

49

27

22

0

0

3037

19

3

16

0

0

3038

34

21

13

0

0

3039

121

49

72

0

0

3041

197

104

91

0

2

3043

43

25

18

0

0

3044

120

70

50

0

0

3045

47

41

6

0

0

3046

51

22

29

0

0

3066

915

403

507

4

3084

623

332

288

1
1

3094

86

25

61

0

0

3170

17

15

2

0

0

3175

521

237

282

0

2

3179

18

7

11

0

0

3250

667

132

533

1

1

3266

255

203

50

0

2

3267

37

33

3

0

1

3269

12

0

11

1

0

3270

127

85

41

0

1

3276

13

6

6

0

1

2
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

3281

216

58

158

0

0

4002

216

30

185

0

1

4006

560

330

229

1

0

4008

114

99

15

0

0

4010

881

434

444

0

3

4013

235

126

108

0

1

4014

45

3

42

0

0

4027

62

46

16

0

0

4044

482

170

312

0

0

4049

36

27

9

0

0

4061

55

7

48

0

0

4074

20

3

17

0

0

4078

19

4

15

0

0

4087

7

1

6

0

0

4092

540

89

448

2

1

4103

61

12

49

0

0

4132

25

24

1

0

0

4136

185

112

73

0

0

4137

75

18

56

1

0

4138

360

93

267

0

0

4139

10

7

2

0

1

4140

28

8

20

0

0

4142

7

4

3

0

0

4144

24

6

18

0

0

4231

18

5

13

0

0

4234

12

4

8

0

0

4235

14

10

4

0

0
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

4263

108

54

54

0

0

5001

12

9

3

0

0

5002

271

150

120

1

0

5004

135

114

21

0

0

5005

16

13

3

0

0

5006

13

8

5

0

0

5007

79

40

38

1

0

5008

37

37

0

0

0

5012

55

54

0

0

1

5020

119

92

25

0

2

5021

275

142

132

0

1

5024

37

16

21

0

0

5030

9

6

3

0

0

5039

202

74

128

0

0

5052

36

31

5

0

0

5053

18

12

6

0

0

5059

60

57

3

0

0

5070

652

500

151

1

0

5073

88

63

24

0

1

5075

14

13

1

0

0

5076

133

126

6

1

0

5082

92

91

1

0

0

5088

28

3

25

0

0

5097

39

19

20

0

0

5102

59

48

11

0

0

5110

6

6

0

0

0

5121

18

15

2

1

0
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

5126

27

25

2

0

0

5129

311

266

44

1

0

5147

230

211

18

0

1

5153

24

8

16

0

0

5160

15

11

4

0

0

5161

33

19

14

0

0

5165

140

31

109

0

0

5194

52

18

34

0

0

5195

42

35

7

0

0

5214

196

145

51

0

0

5251

252

237

13

1

1

5255

19

18

1

0

0

5256

13

13

0

0

0

5264

13

6

7

0

0

5265

78

75

3

0

0

5268

272

224

48

0

0

5269

26

24

2

0

0

5271

12

11

1

0

0

5273

14

14

0

0

0

5274

12

11

1

0

0

5279

9

8

0

0

1

5280

29

12

17

0

0

5281

9

7

2

0

0

5282

98

86

12

0

0

5284

8

3

5

0

0

5285

35

33

2

0

0

5286

14

9

5

0

0
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

5287

17

16

1

0

0

5289

36

35

1

0

0

7002

106

28

77

0

1

7003

150

80

70

0

0

7004

135

115

20

0

0

7010

15

14

1

0

0

7071

41

8

32

1

0

7079

35

22

13

0

0

7081

43

22

21

0

0

7082

20

9

11

0

0

7101

69

11

58

0

0

30

28

2

0

0

7261

67

48

19

0

0

7263

35

25

10

0

0

7266

98

83

14

1

0

7269

49

44

5

0

0

7270

111

16

94

0

1

9016

48

45

3

0

0

9085

182

21

160

0

1

9096

42

9

33

0

0

9109

1,425

770

653

1

1

9110

24

14

10

0

0

9111

16

12

4

0

0

9116

33

9

22

2

0

9138

145

103

40

2

0

9146

176

163

13

0

0

9152

51

35

16

0

0

7115

.
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CHAPTER

TOTAL # OF
BALLOTS

YES

NO

BLANK

VOID

9153

479

247

232

0

0

9154

188

18

170

0

0

12134

11

8

3

0

0

12159

11

10

1

0

0

13024

26

8

18

0

0

13138

9

6

3

0

0

13187

17

16

1

0

0

13209

7

3

4

0

0

14017

193

121

72

0

0

14069

7

1

6

0

0

14205

9

9

0

0

0

14265

10

7

3

0

0

14267

6

4

2

0

0

14286

174

115

59

0

0

14388

11

9

2

0

0

15153

10

8

1

0

1

16165

16

4

12

0

0

16195

73

47

26

0

0

16199

24

20

4

0

0

16261

31

21

9

1

0

17151

25

16

9

0

0

17176

66

38

28

0

0

88889

76

35

41

0

0

GROUP

325

172

152

1

0

NO
DESIGNATION

174

134

40
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Inasmuch as the four hundred twelve (412) envelopes set
aside could not affect the outcome, they were neither ruled on nor
opened and counted.

ERIC SQHME"RTZ
ARBITRATOR

DATED: NOVEMBER
, 1987
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)

On this
day of November, 1987 before me personally came
and appeared ERIC SCHMERTZ, to me known and known to me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and
he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

i OftSITA M.
Notary Public, Sir's of New vo K
NO. 31-483,121
Qualified in New Yo k C
Commission Expires Februa.y

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

_YQluntary_LabQr_ArbilratiQn_Tribunal_
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union United Automobile
FINDINGS OF FACT and
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement^
AWARD
Workers of America, UAW and its Local
Case
#14
300 0260 87 J
677
and
Mack Trucks, Inc.
The Undersigned, in accordance with the Order of Judge
Edward N. Cahn dated July 24, 1987 remanding this matter to
Arbitrator Arthur Stark for "clarification" of his Award of June
19, 1987, with specific authority to determine the "manner, procedures and time limits" of the transfer of employees from
Allentown, Macungie, Hagerstown and Somerset to the Company's
plant in Winnsboro, South Carolina, and in my capacity as the
Arbitrator selected by the above-named Union and Company to replace Mr. Stark, and per force therefore confined to the authority
given to Mr. Stark by the aforesaid Court Order, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties at hearings on
August 8 and 9, 1987, makes the following Findings of Fact and
Award:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Stark 1 s Award clearingly establishes the priority

rights of employees in the Allentown, Macungie, Hagerstown and
Somerset plants to jobs at Winnsboro, over the hiring of "outsiders."

The pertinent parts of tha Award read:

If all Winnsboro jobs are not filled by the Appendix D canvass at Plant 5~C the Company shall make
job offers to persons on the Master Recall List
(Article 6 Section 9(b)(2). Included in that group
are the persons laid off from Macungie as a result
of the Plant 5~C closing.
Jobs at Winnsboro which remain open after the above
contractual procedures have been followed may be
filled by the hiring of persons from the "outside"
(emphasis added).
I also take notice of Judge Cahn's Bench Opinion in which

-2he remanded the case for "a determination of the manner, procedures, and time limits within which Mack will offer to its employees the first opportunity

for employment at the Winnsboro facil-

ity (emphasis added).
2.

Mr. Stark did not put a specific time limit on the

exercise of transfer rights by contractually eligible employees,
nor a time limit on the transfer procedures outlined.

Therefore,

within the meaning and intent of his Award and the Remand Order,
I find it a logical and reasonable clarification of that portion
of his Award that transfers of employees be made up to the point
and time that the Allentown plant is closed.

The only contract

restriction and the only restriction in Mr. Stark's Award is that
"no more than the number of employees equal to the number of employees (sic) operations at the new plant shall be granted by the
Company the right to transfer directly to the job on the transferred work."
I find that the latter restriction further supports the
priority rights of Allentown, Macungie, Hagerstown and Somerset
employees over new hires, because it obviously contemplates that
the full complement at Winnsboro could be made up of transferees.
I find therefore that the Company's canvass, which put
short time limits on the exercise of transfer rights, was inconsistent with that reasonable

intent and clarification of the Award

and inconsistent with the priority of employment at Winnsboro
accorded UAW members at Allentown, Macungie, Hagerstown and
Somerset.
the

This conclusion is further supported by evidence in

record of hardships and other burdensome circumstances which

prevented or inhibited employees from seeking transfers within
the short time allowed.
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3.

The date of October 21, 1987, by which the Company

wanted the Winnsboro plant fully or substantially manned, and
which the Company relies on in justification of its imposed time
limits, is no longer compelling.

At the time of the hearings

before Mr. Stark and the proceedings before Judge Cahn, the
Company stated that the full complement it sought by that date
was 850 employees.
273 "outsiders"

The Court first allowed the Company to hire

(who are now at work).

And I take judicial notice

of the Court's recent ruling allowing the Company to hire a
"second class" of approximately 250 "outsiders."

With 237 trans-

ferees who reported on or about August 3, 1987 from the original
canvass and who are now in place at Winnsboro, the Winnsboro
complement is or imminently will be at about the total complement
specified by the Company during the arbitration before Mr. Stark
and during the Court proceedings leading to the Remand Order.
Therefore the production of trucks at Winnsboro on and after
October 21, 1987, in the event of a strike at other plants at or
around that

date, is not jeopardized by a slower pace of trans-

ferring employees from Allentown, Macungie, Hagerstown and
Somerset.
4.

I find that employees at Allentown, Macungie,

Hagerstown and Somerset now know the relevant terms and conditions of employment at Winnsboro if they transfer, so that in
view of the provisions of my Award below, a wholly new canvass
by the Company or jointly with the Union, which would contain
1. In subsequent proceedings in Court, the Company raised its
desired complement at Winnsboro to over 1300 employees.
However,
as that figure was not before Mr. Stark when he made his Award,
and not before the Court when the : Remand Order was issued, it is
not a fact within my jurisdiction for consideration in clarifying
the Stark Award.
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specific information of said terms and conditions of employment,
is not needed, the flawed original canvass notwithstanding.
AWARD
1.

In addition to the transfers already made
and until the Allentown plant is closed,
the Union may refer contractually eligible
employees from Allentown, Macungie, Hagerstown
and Somerset, and the Company shall accept
such transfers and employ said transferees
in the Winnsboro plant. Referral of transferees shall follow the sequence and procedures set forth in Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
the Stark Award. All such transfers shall
be completed by no later than two weeks after
the Allentown plant is closed. For this purpose those employees contractually eligible
for transfer under and at the time of the
Stark Award shall continue to enjoy transfer
eligibility.
Said transferees shall be placed in and shall
occupy open jobs at Winnsboro.
If open jobs
are not available, said transferees shall have
the right forwith to displace any of the "outsiders." In the event that the total number
of employees seeking transfer exceeds the total
complement at Winnsboro at the time the Allentown
plant closes, the excess shall constitute a pool
of "attritional replacements" under the provisions
of Letter #11. Disputes if any, over the "contractual eligibility" of employees for transfer
shall be resolved by this Arbitrator (or another
arbitrator mutually selected by the parties)
under expedited procedures, and I shall retain
jurisdiction for that purpose.

2.

Subject to their being displaced by transferees
the Company may hire "outsiders."

3.

The terms and conditions of employment at Winnsboro
as set forth in the record by the Company, shall
obtain. However, in addition to transferees carrying or retaining their seniority for "inside
benefit purposes" at Winnsboro, said transferees

T.This is consistent with Judge Cahn's ruling, both as to the
original "outsiders" hired and to the "second class" he subsequently allowed the Company to hire, that they were and are "subordinate and subject to displacement by any individual Mack is
subsequently required to hire and place at work in Winnsboro,
South Carolina as a result of a final Court Order or Arbitration
Award..."
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shall have seniority over any and all of
the "outsiders" for purposes of layoffs
from and recalls to the Winnsboro plant.
4.

With the foregoing, all the provisions of
the Stark Award are affirmed. Mr. Stark's
Award is expressly incorporated herein and
made a part hereof.

5.

In addition to retention of jurisdiction for
the purpose set forth in Award #1 above, I
shall also retain jurisdiction to resolve
disputes, if any, over the application and
interpretation of all the foregoing.
(Alternatively, this retained jurisdiction may be
exercised by another arbitrator mutually
selected by the parties as my replacement, for
that purpose).

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 30, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Hammock Land & Development Corp.
and
Melbourne

AWARD

Exchange

In my interim Award of August 26, 1987, I stated inter
alia :
The parties will make a good faith effort
to close on October 20, 1987, but in no
event later than November 19, 1987. Said
closing to take place in Florida (emphasis
added).
Subsequently all parties were notified that the closing
was scheduled for 3 PM on November 19, 1987 at the offices of
the Warranty Title Insurance Agency, 494 No. Harbor City Boulevard
Melbourne, Florida.
On the date and at the time and location of the duly
scheduled closing, representatives of The Hammock Land & Development Corp. ("Hammock"), specifically Donald J. Scogna and Carol
Thomas appeared, together with Carlos L. Nunez Assistant Vice
President of the Intercontinental Bank of Miami, Florida, Trish
Matarazzo, principal of Warranty Title Insurance Agency and the
Undersigned Arbitrator.
Hammock was ready, willing and able to close at that time.
Representatives of Melbourne Exchange ("Melbourne") including David Rubenstein, did not appear, nor did they communicate
with the Undersigned, with Hammock or its representatives, or
with the Title Company.

Also, John Rice, Frederick Greenberg and

Richard Greenberg of First City Equities of New York City did not
appear nor did they communicate with the Undersigned, with
Hammock or its representatives

or with the Title

Company.
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Messrs. Scogna, Nunez and the Undersigned and Ms. Thomas
and Ms. Matarazzo waited a reasonable time beyond 3 PM for an
appearance by or word from Melbourne and the other persons aforementioned following which the Undersigned determined that Melbourne
and those associated with Melbourne for purposes of the closing
would not appear.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator makes the following Findings and Rulings.
Findings and Rulings constitute

Said

my Award in this matter.

1. Melbourne Exchange and David Rubenstein
have defaulted on their contractual obligation to close no later than November
19, 1987.
2. Those in guarantor or signatory capacities
on behalf of Melbourne Exchange and David
Rubenstein, namely First City Equities,
John Rice, Frederick Greenberg and Richard
Greenberg are also in default in connection
with Melbourne's obligation to close.
3. Due to said default, the contract between
Hammock Land & Development Corp. and
Melbourne Exchange/David Rubenstein, is
terminated.
4. On account of said default, all deposits
are deemed liquidated damages to Hammock,
including a release of the escrowed assignment and satisfaction of the $250,000 Morgan
Commercial Mortgage and releases of any liens
upon the Garrison, North Carolina and
Melbourne Properties owned by Donald F.
Scogna and Theresa Scogna. Therefore all
properties owned by Donald J. Scogna and
Theresa Scogna which were involved in this
transaction, including the Garrison property, North Carolina and the Melbourne
Beach property shall revert to them unconditionally and unencumbered.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5
of my Interim Award shall constitute liabilities and obligations of Melbourne, John Rice
and First City Equities to Hammock, and monies
due and payable thereunder shall be paid forthwith by Melbourne/Rice/First City Equities,
to Hammock.

o

6. the Arbitrator's total fee and expenses
are assessed against Melbourne.
Therefore Melbourne/Rubenstein shall also pay
to Hammock the sum of $6,893, previously
advanced by Hammock.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 7, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

